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vSummary
When pressure over water resources increases in
a given river basin, these resources tend to
become fully committed, with little or no outflow at
the most downstream point in the basin, at least
during some part of the year when river basins
are said to “close.” In such conditions, any
decision to further tap existing water (through
diversion, pumping from watercourses, drains or
wells) at a given point of the hydrological cycle of
the basin is almost certain to impact on preexist-
ing users and/or on the environment. Such new
developments eventually amount only to a reallo-
cation or reappropriation of water by particular
users. This fact points to an intricate and vital
relationship between hydrology and water use, or
in other words, between nature (with all its
climatic uncertainty and complexity) and human
activities (partly regulated by institutions). It also
defines water as a contested resource and sets
the stage for political competition and struggle
between users’ vested interests.
This report provides a case study from the
province of Esfahan, in central Iran that, in many
respects, is exemplary of these different dimen-
sions. It describes the struggle of a village to
secure the water resources without which local
agriculture, and altogether life in the village, would
be impossible. It illustrates the endless ingenuity
of farmers in their quest for water, how land and
water rights have developed, how various legal
repertoires may conflict with one another, and
how the intervention of the state transformed the
wider hydrological cycle of the valley and affected
the delicate equilibrium between population and
resources that had prevailed until then. Means of
accessing surface water and groundwater include
qanats, diversion of the river, harvesting of lateral
runoff, wells, pumping and diversion by pumping
from main irrigation schemes. The report esti-
mates the costs of accessing one cubic meter
from each of these different sources and shows
how political interventions or drought mitigation
policies elicit solutions that are extremely costly.
Water rights in the village are briefly described:
they are accurately defined and give way to short-
term transfers and exchanges as well as perma-
nent transfers. The reconstitution of the history of
the village allows us to analyze changes in
population, land use and water use, and to
interpret the relationship between the pressure
over resources and villagers’ strategies regarding
water-resources development and use.
The study examines three nested scales: the
village, the Najafabad valley and the Zayandeh
Rud basin, and illustrates the most crucial as-
pects of closed basins, whereby any change in
water use or abstraction is likely to be tantamount
to proverbially rob Peter to pay Paul or, meta-
phorically, rob Yadullah’s water to irrigate Saeid’s
garden. The struggle for water increases with the
closure of the basin. While the solutions to local
water scarcity tend to lie more and more up-
stream and at a wider scale, the impacts of local
processes extend further and further downstream.
This critical interconnectedness of actors through
the hydrologic cycle is complex, sometimes
unpredictable, often invisible, frequently ignored
and always obscured by the variability and
fluctuation of hydrological processes. Upstream/
downstream and surface water/groundwater
interactions get more intricate as users diversify
their sources of water and intensify their use.
Unchecked individual initiatives eventually add up
and have a significant impact at the macro level.
Macro-level interventions, in turn, critically alter
the hydrological regime and the preexisting water-
vi
sharing arrangements. In such a process, local
and global interventions tend to conflict, and
control over water to shift toward the state.
These points are illustrated by the
interconnectedness of water resources across
scales. The development of wells in the village
competed with, and impacted on, both local
qanats that supply the same communities and
downstream ones, because of the resulting critical
uptake of groundwater. The distribution of water
from the Mourhab spring along the Najafabad
valley was regulated by age-old agreements
between riparian villages (surface water) and by
the spatial distribution of qanats (groundwater),
the valley aquifer functioning as a distributed
underground reservoir protected from evaporation
losses. This equilibrium between resources and
use was fatally disrupted with the construction of
a reservoir by the state, incurring high costs,
losses by evaporation and a redistribution of
water rights. The development of water use in the
lateral valleys, in turn, impacted on the groundwa-
ter flow to the central valley aquifer and surface
flows to the Zayandeh Rud river. This is com-
pounded by the overexploitation of the aquifer
and the use of deep wells for irrigating a “green
belt” for the city and for other uses. Meanwhile,
water diverted from the river has been increas-
ingly distributed to lateral areas, including the
Esfahan urban area and other distant cities such
as Yazd. These fluxes flowing in opposite direc-
tions have both short- and long-term variations
and compose a complex and not well-known
hydrological pattern.
A crucial consequence of the closure of the
basin is the logical impossibility of overall water
conservation, with the exception of the case where
water flowing to sinks like saline aquifers is re-
duced. Local conservation measures are possible
but they necessarily have third-party impacts, be it
on other users, next generations or on the environ-
ment. Therefore, while such local measures may
benefit the users involved, they eventually amount
to a reallocation of water within the basin. Shifting
the benefit of water may be desirable or not, but it
is rarely explicit and raises questions on water
rights and on third-party impacts.
Water rights are often presented as a natural
remedy to the increase in third-party impacts
stemming from resource reallocation and growing
uncertainty in supply. This case study serves to
illustrate the difficulty in establishing such rights,
first because of the incompleteness of knowledge
on the resource itself, and second because of the
multiscale governance issues inherent in such a
definition.
More generally, the study sketched out an
exploration of the human-water interface whereby
institutions around water allocation and manage-
ment are mediated by political, cultural and
ecological contexts that interact across multiple
spatial and social scales. The complexity of these
macro-micro interactions, however, makes the
state incapable of reordering the basin water
regime by its sole action or by legislation. Con-
structing a sound and sustainable water regime is
contingent upon allowing multilevel governance
patterns that allow interest groups to negotiate
arrangements that bring more certainty, social
value and equity to the sharing of water. In the
Zayandeh Rud basin, the challenge could be to
reestablish the earlier democratic, transparent and
stakeholder-controlled allocation (when mirabs
[water chiefs] were elected), albeit in a much
more complex physical and social setting than in
the past, demanding both an increasing knowl-
edge of the basin hydrology and expanded arenas
of representation and negotiations.
1Introduction
When pressure over water resources increases,
users generally seek ways to conserve1 water,
and try to tap additional sources to increase both
supply and its reliability. This generally incurs
significant costs and requires a lot of ingenuity.
With time, resources tend to be fully committed
when river basins are said to “close,” with little or
no outflow at the most downstream point in the
basin, at least during some part of the year. In
such conditions, any decision to further tap
existing water (through diversion, pumping from
watercourses, drains or wells) at a given point of
the hydrological cycle of the basin is certain2 to
impact on preexisting users and/or on the
environment: new developments eventually
amount only to a reallocation or reappropriation
of water by particular users. This fact points to
an intricate and vital relationship between
hydrology and water use or, in other words,
between nature (with all its climatic uncertainty
and complexity) and human activities (partly
regulated by institutions). It also suggests that
water is likely to be a contested resource and
sets the stage for political competition and
struggle between users’ vested interests.
This report provides a case study from the
Zayandeh Rud basin, in central Iran, that is in
many respects exemplary of these different
dimensions. It describes the struggle of a village
to secure the water resources without which local
agriculture, and indeed life in the village, would
be impossible. It illustrates the endless ingenuity
of farmers in their quest for water, how land and
water rights have developed, how various legal
repertoires conflict with one another, and how the
intervention of the state transformed the wider
hydrological cycle of the valley and affected the
delicate equilibrium of the population and
resources that had prevailed until then. The
study illustrates the most crucial aspects of
closed basins, whereby any change in water
abstraction is likely to be tantamount to
proverbially rob Peter to pay Paul or,
metaphorically, rob Yadullah’s water to irrigate
Saeid’s garden.
The report begins with a description of the
physical setting and early water use and rights to
water. Then it establishes a chronology of
changes in water demand and supply at the
village level. The cost of water and land, as well
as their exchanges and transfers, are further
examined, as a way to emphasize both their
relative economic values and their importance in
the village community. The subsequent section
Robbing Yadullah’s Water to Irrigate Saeid’s Garden:
Hydrology and Water Rights in a Village of Central
Iran
François Molle, Alireza Mamanpoush, Mokhtar Miranzadeh
1Conservation here refers to a particular user who seeks to either reduce the return flow from a given amount of water he is diverting/pumping
(usually, eventually depleting more of it), or—more rarely—to reduce his diversion, while achieving the same output (more water being available
to downstream users from the same source but less to earlier appropriators of return flows).
2As pointed out by a reviewer, a new intervention in an open basin may have a third-party impact while that in a closed basin always has
such an impact.
2dwells on the central issue of water rights, and
shows how both hydrologic and socio-institutional
complexities make the definition of such rights
problematic. These complexities are shown to
concentrated in the November-April period (figure
2). Temperatures are hot in summer, reaching an
average of 30 oC in July, but are cool in winter
dropping to an average minimum of 3 oC in
January. Annual potential evapotranspiration is
1,500 millimeters (Murray-Rust et al. 2000). The
Gavkhuni swamp, at the downstream point of the
river basin, is a natural salt pan, surrounded by
sandy soils and dunes. Water entering the
swamp area is extremely saline, with EC values
as high as 30 dS/m during periods of low flow
(Salemi et al. 2000).
FIGURE 1.
The Zayandeh Rud basin and the Najafabad valley.
Jalalabad and the Najafabad Valley: The Setting
economic significance is attached to the city of
Esfahan, with its rich and ancient history. The
Zayandeh Rud originates in the Zagros
mountains, where rainfall and snow are rather
abundant, and traverses arid areas to empty into
the swamp of Gavkhuni. The mountainous part of
the basin culminates at around 2,300 meters but
Esfahan and its fertile plains stand at an altitude
of around 1,500 meters. While rainfall in the
catchment of the dam averages 1,700 millimeters
(with 55 days with snow events and 15 of rains),
Esfahan receives only 130 millimeters per year,
extend across scales, from the village and the
valley surveyed to the whole basin.
The Zayandeh Rud basin covers 41,500 km2 in
the center of Iran (figure 1). Its historical and
3From time immemorial water has been
diverted from the Zayandeh Rud to supply
Esfahan and irrigate its gardens and neighboring
areas. Numerous springs and qanats (see
definition in box 1) located in the central and
lateral valleys were also used. The Najafabad3
valley, the site of the present case study, has
106 qanats totaling 266 kilometers in length and
several springs (Hartl 1989), the main of which is
the Mourhab spring, which in normal years
FIGURE 2.
Rainfall pattern in the Zayandeh Rud basin.
3Najafabad itself is a rather recent city: A legend reports that during the reign of Shah Abbas a caravan had been loaded with a heavy tribute
collected by the Shiite faithful and destined to the holy city of Najaf (currently in Iraq) and when passing through what is now the middle of the
city the leading camel suddenly lay down and refused to move any further. Informed about the incident, Shah Abbas had declared this was a
sign that the wealth carried by the caravan should not be transported to Najaf but, rather, be used to found a city (which was to bear the
name of Najaf), including its water supply through the digging of 17 qanats in the valley and collection of their water by a canal (Abary 2003).
FIGURE 3.
Layout of the Najafabad valley.
4BOX 1.
The qanats.
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provides an average discharge of 2–5 m3/s to the
lower half of the valley (but drops to 200 l/s in
autumn [figure 3]). The city of Najafabad itself
had used its wealth and royal support to tap the
water of 17 qanats, distant from the city by as
much as 100 kilometers and collected by a canal
that follows the valley and irrigates the old and
lush gardens of the city.
It is only with the excavation of a first tunnel
bringing water from the adjacent Kurang basin
(1953) and the completion of the Chadegan
reservoir in 1970 (see figure 1) that supply and
storage in the basin dramatically increased,
ushering a new era of infrastructural
development. Irrigated schemes with a command
area of approximately 160,000 hectares were
developed around Esfahan and were supplied
with reliable water during 8 months of the year
(March to October), allowing double-cropping in a
large part of the area. However, in many cases,
these modern schemes were superimposed on
ancient systems consisting of maadi (run-of-the-
river canals) and sometimes qanats. The gains
were thus limited. Supply to the Chadegan
reservoir was augmented in 1986 by additional
diversion of water from the Kurang river (in
Chaharmahal-va-Bakhtiari Province) into the
upper reaches of the Zayandeh Rud. The two
diversion tunnels can now deliver 540 million
cubic meters of water and a third tunnel is under
construction and should be in operation in 2005.
5BOX 1.
The qanats.
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6In contrast to the main central valley whose
supply of water is regulated by the Chadegan
reservoir, changes in the lateral valleys of the
basin, such as the Najafabad valley, have been
less significant. Springs and qanats have
continued to make up the bulk of water supply
but they have been gradually undermined by the
development of wells. These developments have
also critically reduced the underground lateral
recharge of the Zayandeh Rud, an aspect which
is often overlooked (Morid 2003). Gieske and
Miranzadeh (2003), for example, have estimated
that approximately 250 million m3 out of a yearly
yield of 275 m3 of groundwater in the Lenjanat
alluvial fan aquifer are now tapped.
Jalalabad, the subject of this study, is a
village of approximately 3,000 inhabitants
covering 11,000 hectares. It is located in the
lower reach of a 110-kilometer-long valley4
flanked by two high mountains ending up in
Najafabad, a city now forming part of the western
suburbs of Esfahan, which is the capital of the
province with a population of 2 million. Rainfall
around the Najafabad city varies between 85 and
204 millimeters but almost half the annual
precipitation can fall within 5 days (Hartl 1989).
In the Safavid period (sixteenth to seventeenth
centuries), the village was situated one kilometer
upstream of its current location, where ruins of
its destruction by Afghan invaders circa 1725 still
remain. There is little doubt that settlements in
this rich valley situated in the vicinity of Esfahan,
and the construction of qanats, predate this
event by many centuries but no particular details
were readily available in the Jalalabad village.5
4 We consider in what follows only the lower reach of the Najafabad valley, from the Mourhab sources to the Zayandeh Rud. The upper reach
can be dissociated for analytical purposes, since it contributes little water to the lower reach.
5 Old people refer to Jalalabad as Aliabad.
7Water Infrastructure
Around 1900, Zélé Sultan, the Governor of
Esfahan tried to revitalize the valley, which had
not yet been fully resettled and put under
cultivation. Some people were brought6 in or
migrated from other regions (such as the Yazd
Province) and the village of Aliabad (the earlier
name of Jalalabad) therefore saw an influx of
population. The main sources of supply of the
village until the 1960s were two qanats (figure 4)
(see box 1 for further information on qanats).
Aliabad qanat is located on the right of the river
and was used to irrigate a tract of land that
extends down to the limits of the next village
(Jusdun) and was cultivated mostly with crops
such as melon, watermelon, soybean and cotton.
The Jahanabad qanat is a longer qanat that taps
groundwater from the right bank (upstream of
Aliabad qanat) but its water is channeled to the
left bank through an inverted siphon (“camel-neck
pipe” in local parlance) that allows the crossing
of the riverbed. Its water is then directed to the
gardens located along the river and divided
among the farmers.
The village is also traversed by the Jusdun
qanat, which emerges close to the outlet of the
Jahanabad qanat. Its water is conducted along a
ditch through the gardens (the ditch is now lined
at the section that crosses the village itself) and
empties into a shaft, which feeds an underground
gallery (or short qanat) that eventually emerges 3
kilometers downstream near Jusdun. Jalalabad is
entitled to use this water for domestic needs
Early Water Rights and Sources of Water in Jalalabad
6It is reported that forced migration was utilized as a punishment, particularly in Najafabad.
FIGURE 4.
Early land and water use in Jalalabad (circa 1960).
8(including the supply to the mosque) but not to
divert it for irrigation purposes. Two other qanats
also follow the northern boundaries of the village
(not shown). They collect water for areas located
further east, beyond Najafabad itself.7
Agriculture in the village was limited to a core
sector of orchards and cereals (wheat and
barley) corresponding to the land owned by the
villagers, and lateral fields, which would be
irrigated to an extent depending on the observed
discharge of both the river and the qanats in
early spring. These areas were planted with
crops such as soybean, melon or watermelon
and could extend widely across the valley. The
track of land irrigated by the Aliabad qanat was
also planted with such crops, together with cotton
(see figure 4). However, this situation improved
around 1960 when both water sources and
agricultural areas began to expand. This
expansion is chronologically detailed in section 4.
Water rights
In the beginning of the last century, the land
belonged to Sarey Modulay Akbar Mirizha, the
son of Zélé Sultan (Qadjar dynasty), who had
been given three villages of the lower valley
(Aliabad, Jusdun and Kaley Sefid). Sarey
Modulay is said to have had a particular affection
for the Aliabad village and, in 1935, he sold a
part of the land (2/6) to six main lineages of the
village, each part constituting a dong8 named
after the main family or clan: Arbabi, Yazdi,
Abedini, Kaley Sefidi, Hajbarati and Gholami.
(The remaining 4/6 were bought from the state
on credit by villagers in 1966, during the Land
Reform).
Water rights were defined by the number of
hours of the full qanat discharge allocated every
6 days9 to a particular plot or set of plots. For
convenience these plots were grouped in 12 lots
of similar size that were to receive water during
12 hours (12 hours x 12 lots = 6 days). For
reasons not entirely clear but said to reflect a
concern for equity, each dong was given two of
these lots, one located in the upper reach and
the other in the lower reach (see figure 5). Only
the Kaley Sefidi dong had all its land in a single
lot in the middle part of the canal. Water delivery
would start by the Yazdi dong at sunrise of the
first day, with the first 12 hours granted to the
head lot and the second 12 hours (at night) to
the tail lot. On the second day, water would go to
the Gholami dong, and on the following days to
the four other dongs, as shown in figure 5. After
6 days, the head- and tail-end lots would swap
their time slot so that those who were irrigating
by day would find themselves with the night turn
and vice versa. Because of the 6-day-long
rotation, each week the day allotted to a
particular dong is shifted back by one day (e.g.,
from Monday to Sunday, etc.). This system
entails that the time (approximately 20 minutes
for the Yazdi dong) taken by the water to flow
from the head lot to the tail lot is lost; this loss is
divided equally among shareholders. Altogether,
the 288 half-hours of the 6-day rotation are
precisely allocated (see next section).
To this source of water is added the flow
from the Mourhab river itself. In the seventeenth
century, the village was granted a right to 2.5 of
30 parts of the Mourhab water, defined as 80
days after 21 March during which the village was
allowed to divert the residual flow of the river to
7This case is quite frequent, since qanats in Iran are 2 kilometers long on average and need to collect water upstream of villages they frequently
overlap with other villages.
8The dong (or the 6th part of an asset) is a traditional share in Iran. Properties are generally divided into six dongs.
9The period of 6 days corresponds to the tolerance frequency of sensitive crops, and also matches the traditional way of dividing by six.
However, the literature on qanats shows extreme variation depending, among other things, on climate, soil type and cropping patterns, and
the periodicity varies between 6 and 24 days (see examples in Lambton 1953; McLachan 1988; Ehlers and Saidi 1989; Beaumont 1989;
English 1989; Spooner 1974b; etc.).
9its fields. This right is said to have been defined
by Sheikh Bahai, who codified the rights to water
in the Zayandeh Rud basin at the time of Shah
Abbas, in the second half of the sixteenth
century during the Safavid period (Lambton
1938), but there is evidence that such regulations
are much older.10 The flow of the Mourhab river
was diverted one kilometer upstream of the
village and was consolidated with the qanat flow
at the exit of the siphon (figure 4). In years when
this consolidated flow was abundant, villagers
would divert it to the land located north of the
gardens and use it to grow watermelon or cotton,
just as with the Aliabad qanat on the other side
of the river. The sharing of water along the river
according to the rights established was controlled
by a mirab (chief of water) assisted by several
overseers.
Water management
Water owners have a clear and precise sense of
their ownership of water. They know exactly at
which time they are allowed to make use of their
long-handled spade to breach the bund of their
plot and divert water into it. They know after how
many minutes they must close the bund and let
water flow to the next plot. They also know
precisely the rights and associated times of their
dong-fellows who share the 12-hour turn with
them. Therefore, they commonly take care of the
irrigation of their neighbor’s plots, either because
this has been agreed upon, or because the latter
did not show up at the required time. In general,
however, all villagers have motorcycles and
watches and tend to be very punctual in making
use of their allotment every 6 days.
FIGURE 5.
Repartition of water rights (rotation over 6 days).
10Ibn Rusteh (1889), for example, who wrote in the early tenth century, mentions that water use was unrestricted until the district of Alandjan,
while the distribution to the following districts of Djay, Marbin, Alandjan, Baraan, Rud and Ruwaidasht was organized following “rules established
by Ardashir Ibn Babak.” Ibn Hawqal, four decades later, also reports that the sharing of the Zayandeh Rud water was “calculated” so that no
water would be lost. Ruwaidasht and Baraan districts, for example, are reported to receive water during 9 days each month.
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Their long experience with the collective and
scheduled practice of irrigation, as well as the
close social relationship between members of the
same dong, allow for much flexibility in water
management. Water transactions can occur
within one of the four sectors (subareas served
by the same branch canal), or even within six,
considering the two sectors using only
groundwater, or between sectors, according to
several modalities (more on this later).
The accurate measurement of time is crucial.
In ancient times, this was done by using water
clocks (bowls with an orifice at their bottom that
were placed floating in a larger receptacle, each
sinking of the bowl measuring one unit of time).
Watches became common 40 years ago but the
start of the daily rotation was still based on the
sunrise. It was only 20 years ago that the use of
watches was fully resorted to, which marked the
end of the recurrent disputes regarding time
sharing.
In case the discharge in the canal is too low,
then the 6-day rotation is increased to 12 days
and the full flow is given to only one side during
12 hours, instead of being divided into two. In
the opposite case, the excess flow is diverted to
the riverbed or to some depressions where water
is impounded with the aim of recharging the
aquifer. Twenty years ago or earlier, they would
also send part of the diverted flow to the
northern part of the village, where watermelons
and other field crops were grown.
Although the Qanat Committee is the
guarantor of the water rights, collects the fees for
payment of the Nekouabad canal water and also
supervises the two crucial points where the qanat
flows are divided (branch going to mazrae jadid,
and main division structure at the exit of the
qanat: see picture below), it has no role in water
management beyond this point. Management is
taken care of by the dongs themselves, which
regulate their internal distribution. No one in the
village is aware of the full details of the system.
Repartition between dongs is strictly defined by
blocks of 12 hours and therefore needs no
adjustment or supervision. This striking lack of
centralized control goes together with a strict
adherence to the established rights and
schedules. Following Spooner (1974b), this can
be partly ascribed to the fact that since “any
disturbance of the temporal distribution systems
affects all shareholders adversely, the normal
premium on social order is increased.”
Farmer at work Lined canalStructure to divide the
qanat flow
11
This section records the parallel development of
water supply and water uses over the last
century and illustrates how the challenges posed
by population growth or by the decline of some
water sources were dealt with.
The Postwar (WWII) Period and the
1963–64 Drought
The 1950s and the early 1960s were a period of
abundance of water. Population and crop areas
were still limited, and villagers enjoyed a
sustained discharge from the two qanats. Some
villagers who had land near the left bank of the
river also diverted part of the Aliabad qanat to
the other bank by means of a pipe forming an
aqueduct.
In the early sixties, the villagers decided to
expand the cultivation area on the basis of the
available water. A large area of 240 hectares
north of the core area, named mazrae,11 was
developed (figure 6). Unlike the core sector,
where each dong had both head-end and tail-end
lots, the design was simplified and a mazrae was
divided into six parts attributed to the six dongs.
The flow from the Jahanabad qanat was divided
into three parts, two parts going to the core
sector, and the third part to the new sector.
Individuals received new plots, in proportion to
their water rights in the core sector. The same
irrigation schedule with a 6-day rotation was
adopted and the period of 24 hours allotted to a
given dong was chosen to coincide with those in
the core area, so that irrigation operations could
be concentrated in one day.
This period of abundance ended abruptly.
Droughts are said to be recurrent events in the
valley (with an occurrence of approximately four
or five in a century). However, they differ in
intensity and duration, and their impact depends
on the ratio of demand to supply and the
existence or nonexistence of some slack. The
1963–64 drought is still very present in the
A Chronology of Water Demand and Supply
FIGURE 6.
Successive phases of expansion of the village gardens (with water rights).
11Mazrae means irrigated farm(land). The sector would later be named mazrae qadim (old), when a new area named mazrae jadid (new)
would be opened.
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memory of the older generations. It is said that
most gardens were abandoned and that a large
part of a population of 650 villagers left for
Najafabad in quest of alternative work and other
means of livelihood while around 300 remained in
the village. With the hydrological conditions
gradually returning to normal, however, most
people returned to the village in the following
years, but some established themselves in
Najafabad. Many of the trees had died
necessitating the planting of new trees.
A few years after the drought, just before the
revolution, the continuous efforts of the villagers
in maintaining and extending the gallery of the
main qanat were rewarded with a fortunate find.
Noting that water was squirting from the ground
of the gallery, the workers dug a vertical shaft
from a depth of –7 meters to –12 meters and
connected with a “vein” of water that doubled the
discharge of the qanat, which reached its
maximum value of 180 l/s. This increase in
supply in the late 1970s led to the decision to
expand the gardens by opening a new sector of
approximately 100 hectares at the northern limit
of the village. This sector was called Surkhan
(red) because of the color of the earth in this
area (figure 5). The flow of the qanat was
consequently divided into four equal parts, and
the new sector allotted to shareholders based on
the pattern adopted earlier for the mazrae.
Likewise, the 6-day rotation was adopted again.
The Revolution and Wartime (1979–
1989) and the Development of Wells
The period of the revolution is first of all marked by
the continuing development of shallow wells. This
was part of a policy emphasizing self-reliance and
the development of production, coupled with a
strong stance in favor of population growth (which
reached a rate of 3.8% in the 1980s).12 This
development seems to have been based on an
inadequate hydrological analysis and villagers got
into the business of well digging,13 despite
reservations and awareness that qanats might be
impacted. The wells did, indeed, bring a dramatic
increase in water supply, probably tapping
underground flows, which were directly flowing to
nearby or downstream qanats, as well as
recharging the main aquifers along the Zayandeh
Rud itself. Two new areas were therefore
collectively developed and irrigated exclusively with
wells: four wells were dug in the upper part of the
village, upstream of the gardens irrigated by the
water of the qanat, and four others were dug on
the other side of the river (figure 5). As a result,
the Aliabad qanat was soon to see its discharge
dwindling and eventually drying up.
In addition, villagers obtained a permit to dig 15
wells within the existing gardens, as a way to boost
the available water per hectare of garden. These
investments were made by farmers from the same
dong, or from an association of two dongs, and the
distribution network of the well water was
superimposed on the existing canal network (see
box 2). The water is distributed through earth
canals to nearby plots (sometimes using the
existing canal network but not always), and through
pipes to more distant plots. The impact of well
development on the discharge of qanats confirmed
the intuition of farmers about the
interconnectedness of the different water sources.
Wells dug without licenses by individuals, in
particular in the catchment area of the main qanat,
were opposed by farmers and were filled in by
force (this was to happen recurrently and as
recently as 4 years ago).
12“Because of Iran’s enormous natural resources and the regional and global mandates of the Revolution, a large, rapidly growing, and young
population was a highly desirable asset rather than a liability” (Meyhrar 1995). Demographic statistics for this period are complex because of
the flow of refugees from the fatalities of the war across the Iraqi and Afghan frontiers, and of the exodus of an estimated 1–3 million people.
However, there is no doubt that the postrevolution period, with its emphasis on the virtues of early marriage and having children, fueled an
unprecedented demographic boom. In 1991, the annual growth rate had dwindled down to 2.45, and reached 1.5 in the 1996 census!
13Two wells had already been dug in the late 1960s in the core gardens in response to the drought.
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BOX 2.
Wells and pumping stations.
Example of intricacy in the
distribution network
A pumping station (well)
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Rights to well water are also defined in
shares of functioning time, in proportion to the
contribution of each individual to the investment.
It is to be noted that not all farmers in a given
dong subscribed to the investment (for lack of
means or interest, or for already having sufficient
water endowment), although the great majority
did. When water was abundant, before the
drought, the electric pumps could be operated
almost with no interruption (in practice 22 hours/
day). At the end of the drought, in contrast,
water in the wells would dry up after 2 hours and
pumping had to be interrupted until water filled it
again, allowing only 8 hours of operation per day
on average (some wells allowed only 2 hours of
operation per day).
In the mid-1980s, a new source of water was
added. Water was diverted through a pipe from
the Nekouabad right bank main canal
(constructed in 1970), some 10 kilometers further
downstream, requiring two successive pumping
stations: out of the 400 l/s brought into the area14
a constant discharge of 60 l/s during 8 months
was granted to the village (figure 7). This flow
was incorporated to the qanat flow at the very
entrance to the village, before its division into
FIGURE 7.
New water developments in the Najafabad valley.
different canals (see picture above). This means
that the benefits of the canal water accrue to
existing water-rights holders and that water is not
used for other uses or expansion of the irrigated
area. This water is paid for at the price of 4
tumans/m3 ( 0.004/m3).
The substantial increase in supply brought
about by the wells and the Nekouabad diversion
allowed some land expansion and also
intensification in the core sector. The area of the
garden was increased from 200 hectares to 250
hectares. The remaining 400 hectares devoted to
14140 l/s go to Najafabad, and the rest to many smaller users (hospital, etc.).
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cereals and other annual crops were fully
cultivated, in contrast to the earlier situation
when half was left fallow each year. Ten hectares
were also cultivated with rice, because of the
high price it fetched.
The Revolution also marked the end of the
regulation of the Mourhab river by the mirab.15
This disruption allegedly allowed upstream
villages, notably Askaran, the first served by the
Mourhab water, to appropriate more than its
share. The regulatory function was taken over by
state organizations resulting in less transparency
and eventually strengthening the power of the
state to modify traditional rights, as events would
soon show.
From this period also dates the expansion of
chicken farms. About ten farms are located in
the village but they are generally undertakings by
outsiders. The village benefits little from these
chicken farms since they mostly employ Afghan
labor.16 They use limited water and sell the dung
to farmers.
Last, the war time (1980–88) was a confused
period from the point of view of demography.
While Jalalabad counts 40 martyrs for a
population of 2000 at the time, it also saw the
influx of a population fleeing the war zone in
Khuzistan (mostly Loros). These refugees settled
in the village but hardly got involved in agriculture
because they commuted daily to Najafabad.
The Khamiran Dam (1993) and Its
Impact
Originally undertaken by the Ministry of Jihad in
the late 1980s, the Khamiran dam was probably
a well-intentioned attempt to increase the storage
for local use in the valley. Because of the lack of
a favorable location to site a reservoir across the
main valley, the Khamiran dam was constructed
on a tributary of the Mourhab river, on the right
hand side of the valley (see figure 7). This
situation made it necessary to build a diversion
weir on the river (200 meters downstream of the
Mourhab springs themselves) and a 20-kilometer-
long lined adduction canal on a contour line of
the right flank of the valley.
Since the dam is not able to supply the
upper part of the valley because of its position,
another canal branching off the diversion weir
takes water to the village of Askaran. Instead of
the “natural” system of recharge through the
stream that prevailed for centuries, the dam is
now supplying water to downstream villages
through another lined canal approximately 40
kilometers long. This canal, however, stops short
of supplying Jalalabad and the villages further
downstream. The dam was completed in 1992
and has a capacity of 6.8 million m3. It was built
by the Ministry of Jihad and Agriculture but was
eventually taken over by the Ministry of Energy,
which imposed water fees higher than those
proposed by the Ministry of Jihad.
To increase the value and usefulness of the
Khamiran dam and extend the benefits of the
Chadegan reservoir to other valleys, a plan was
drawn to pump water from the latter over the
mountain ridge into the former (see figure 7). In
1991, the Karvan pump station was constructed
for that purpose but it faced severe technical
problems and its operation was discontinued
after 3 or 4 years (Newson and Ghazi 1995).
The dam had a dramatic impact on the
hydrology of the valley. First, with the Mourhab
itself now fully diverted, the flow in the river
stopped. Villagers in Jalalabad report that in
ancient times the river would provide abundant
15Ibrahim Totkha, the then mirab, known for his strict enforcement of the ancient rules of water sharing, was accused of having participated in
a counterrevolutionary attack on Najafabad with people from Tiran (his hometown) and was later executed.
16In addition to cheap labor, Afghans are also accommodated within the farm and thus serve as guards against thievery during the night.
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fishes during spring and sometimes early
summer, that it was often not possible to walk
across it, and that they even happened to play
on its frozen water during the winter time (40
years ago). Second, the lack of flow in the river
dried up the main source of recharge of the
aquifer, and qanats, springs and some wells
started to falter. For example, the Jusdun qanat
is believed to have dried up because of the dam.
Similarly, the qanats in the villages of Jafarabad,
Methiabad, Asfhan, etc., also dried up. It was
only in years of abundant rainfall and snow,
when the dam ended up spilling, that the
situation tended to return to normal, albeit not
fully, clearly demonstrating to villagers the
negative impact of the reservoir.17
These changes overrode the traditional rights
on the Mourhab. Because some villages, like
Nezhatabad, had developed quite lately they
were deprived of rights but with these new
changes they were allocated part of the water
coming from the dam. Other former rights
holders, like Jalalabad villagers, lost the benefit
of the river. Even, those villages like Tiran, which
formerly had 6 of the 15 parts of the river, had to
pay18 for the very water they had freely enjoyed
for centuries. The dam resulted in the canceling
and redistribution of rights. It is hard to tell
without further analysis what the change in the
water balance of the valley has been but the
losses by evaporation (1 million m3,19 out of a
maximum storage capacity of roughly 7 million
m3) and the stopping of the earlier river flow from
the valley into the Zayandeh Rud suggest that
the overall supply is unlikely to have been
increased.20 The crucial point not to be missed is
that the dam, at a high financial cost, disrupted
the delicate and continuous recharge of the
valley aquifer provided by the river flow.
Consequently, the longstanding balance between
this recharge and the tapping of the aquifer
through the qanats, already significantly altered
and jeopardized by the development of wells,
was critically disturbed. Qanats, and even some
wells, were further undermined.
This change did not remain unchallenged.
Villagers organized themselves and demonstrated
against this change in Tiran and other places.
These demonstrations ended up with some
fatalities but to no avail, the dam being
eventually used as planned. In Jalalabad, the
drop in water supply from the Mourhab resulted
in the loss of approximately 3 months of river
water, corresponding to the ancient diversion
rights. (During such months the diverted flow
generally largely exceeded the flow from the
qanat).
In 1996, a strip of land along the riverbank of
approximately 150 hectares, named mazrae
jadid, was planted with almond trees and put
under irrigation (figure 6). Part of the water rights
of the core sector was reallocated to this new
land. However, as will be seen later, this decision
was driven by considerations other than the need
for more land (or a favorable water/land ratio).
17The relation between the qanats and the valley aquifer are complex: while some qanats mainly tap aquifers recharged by lateral runoff from
the mountain infiltrating the sides of the valley, many have part of their course close to the river and sometimes even cross it underneath.
They are, thus, also tapping the valley aquifer.
18The village of Khamiran, at the foot of the dam, is paying 2 million tumans for a discharge supposed to be 40 l/s, but still maintained at 20–
25 l/s, that is, 2.4 tumans/m3 at full supply but 4.8 tumans l/s in reality. Aziabad, the last village to receive water, upstream of Jalalabad, is
reported to pay 1.6 million tumans for 60 l/s, or 1 tuman/m3 at full supply.
19This order of magnitude is calculated based on an average water area in the dam taken as half of the maximum area.
20It may be that the dam, through its impact on groundwater flow to the lower reach of the valley, has increased the water made available to
the valley itself, but if this is the case it occurred to the detriment of farmers tapping the aquifer, at the juncture between the Najafabad valley
and the Zayandeh Rud valley.
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The 1999–2001 Drought and Its
Aftermath
The 3-year drought that hit the region during
1999–2001 (but which for some farmers started
even 2 or 3 years earlier, as discharges started
to decline) was of exceptional severity. The 3
years not only ranked lowest as regards the
inflow into the Chadegan dam since its
completion in 1970, but these exceptionally dry
years also happened consecutively (Molle and
Mamanpoush 2004).
Most qanats in the Mourhab valley, including
Aliabad and Jusdun qanats in the village, dried
up. Wells with insufficient depth or located far
from the river also dried up. The upper well
sector had to be abandoned, as its four wells ran
out of water. (The agricultural area of Qarib
Khan, 2 kilometers upstream of Jalalabad and
farmed by another village, underwent the same
fate). Two of the four wells of the right bank well
sector better resisted and most of the area could
be saved.
The raising of sheep by approximately 100
families was also severely impacted by the drought
because of the scarcity of fodder. The owner of a
major herd estimated that the number of sheep in
the village decreased from 3,000 to 1,500.
The drought also made it clear that the
Nekouabad water delivered by the pipe could not
be considered as fully reliable. Indeed, the
Ministry of Energy was unable to maintain
allocation at the nominal level of 60 l/s and
reduced it to approximately 40 l/s (while the full
fee was maintained). In 2003, despite the return
to normal conditions in the Chadegan reservoir,
the incoming water was still at 40 l/s but farmers
had no means to question this situation.
This dramatic situation of stress on all
available water resources led to a desperate
search for remedial measures. First, most of the
main distribution canals in the village were lined
(at a cost of 2 million tumans or  2,000).
Second, work on the furthering of the Jahanabad
qanat was undertaken in 2000 and is due to
continue for several years.21 The work
concentrates on the second branch (see figure
8), which now crosses the bed of a right bank
tributary in two locations and is going to intersect
the main branch, although at a much higher
depth.
Another ambitious initiative aimed at
damming the Mourhab water, in order to capture
whatever flow might occur in the future. Since no
proper storage is possible in the valley itself
because of its flatness, the river is diverted to a
lateral earth dam (similar to the Khamiran
scheme), which has a rather long bund and is
also able to collect lateral runoff. The dam is said
to have a capacity of 400,000 m3 filled only by
half during 2002, when rainfall was particularly
abundant. This work on the qanat and canal
lining amounted to 36 million tumans ( 36,000)
and was paid by the government through the
Ministry of Jihad and Agriculture.
Another solution to soothe the financial
squeeze experienced by farmers was the
financing, from 1997 onward, of electric pumps,
replacing the diesel-engine-driven ones, at a cost
of 5–7 million tumans/well. From 2000, this shift
was subsidized by the government (40% of
costs); it allowed the decrease of operational
costs, from 14,000 tumans to 5,000 tumans/hour
of right (in 6 days).
With the lack of water, water management
was altered and farmers concentrated their water
rights in some plots or some trees, leading to an
increase in transactions in land and water rights
(see section 6). They also endeavored to
improve the application of water. In orchards
21Six persons work on a shaft, and two shafts are used at the same time to evacuate the spoil of the excavation. During the 2 months preceding
the survey, the qanat was extended by 17 meters. A length of 0.80 centimeter gives approximately one cubic meter of spoil paid at 55,000
tumans.
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formerly irrigated by the basin, furrows and
circular depressions around the trees were soon
to appear.
In 2002 and 2003, the situation was on the
way to recovery but the supply from all sources,
qanat, canal and wells, was still under half of the
potential or “normal” value. Wells, in particular,
have not recovered yet and those which could be
operated a total of 8 hours a day during the
drought can now be used 10 hours a day.
Approximately half of the gardens, however, have
been lost. Discouragement was running high but
a few gardens were started to be planted anew.
Synthesis
This short retrospective can now be synthesized
to show a successive phase of adjustment
between supply and demand, principally driven
by population and hydrological change.22 It is also
possible to draw charts showing the evolution of
the ratio between three variables: population,
cropping area and available discharge.
The population in the village was around 400
in 1950 and 650 when the 1964 drought hit the
village. Over half of the inhabitants left during
that event but most returned during the following
years. The population built up to 1,300 in 1978
and to 2,000 in 1985. At present, the population
of the village is estimated at 3,000 but many
people reside in the village and work outside
during the day. In compensation, it is estimated
that a much higher number of families live in
Najafabad or elsewhere, but partly retain rights
and activities in the gardens of the village. This
expansion of the “village” in Najafabad was a
lengthy process but could not be captured for
lack of data. The population variable thus tends
to lose its meaning as the economy diversifies
22A more complete study should consider other factors, such as economic factors, which determine the return to land and water and therefore
the minimum area to sustain a family. Such historical data, however, are hard to collect and we limit ourselves here to the examination of
plain ratios between land, water and population.
FIGURE 8.
Remedial initiatives taken by villagers against the drought.
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with the people toing and froing daily between
the village and the city. For lack of more precise
information, however, we have considered that
the two opposite effects cancelled each other
and retained the nominal population as an
indicator to be combined with land and water to
express pressure over resources.
Changes in cultivated area and available
discharge cannot be accurately reconstituted. In
particular, it is hard to account for yearly
variations and to estimate the average extent of
the lateral areas that were cultivated in
accordance with the water available each year.
Another difficulty is that the crop mix is also
unknown and, considering the average area
under cultivation, it does not capture the fact that
cereals and gardens do not really compete for
water since their water requirements are largely
staggered, or the fact that rice23 cultivation
requires much more water than dry cereals.
Although it is not possible to represent year-
to-year variability (but the recent and the 1964
drought are considered) or to obtain very
accurate values of these variables, the estimates
collected are plotted with the aim of outlining
qualitative trends that can support the analysis.24
Figures 9, 10 and 11 plot ratios between these
three variables. Dotted and solid lines represent
estimates with and without considering the
Aliabad qanat, respectively.
It can be seen from figure 9 that the ratio of
population to land was rather stable until 1970,
then rose slightly until the 1999 drought where
the loss of gardens reflected negatively. It is
possible that the increase in the last three
decades mirrors growing pressure over land
resources, as determined by water supply. It is
also possible that this evolution is overrated
(because of the non-consideration of the
occasional peripheral plots) or compensated for
by a growing garden/cereal ratio that ensures
growth in water productivity. It is therefore
probably more correct to conclude that the
growth in pressure over land resources has been
in fact very moderate, as new water resources
have allowed expansion of agriculture. Figure 10,
in fact, shows that the available water per
hectare of land remained around 0.1 l/s/ha until
the Revolution, when the increase in the qanat
discharge, wells and other sources gradually
allowed the ratio to double, before collapsing
dramatically during the drought. Last, the ratio of
water to population (figure 11) declined (with a
discontinuity during the first drought), especially
during the seventies, before increasing and
leveling off. Evolution in recent years is however
uncertain and inconclusive because the number
of people relying on agriculture is not known with
accuracy.
23Some villagers with enough water rights grow rice since the price of rice is much higher than that of other cereals, but this cultivation is
limited.
24Tabulated data used for this analysis are given in the appendix.
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FIGURE 11.
Evolution of the discharge/capita ratio.
FIGURE 9.
Evolution of the population/irrigated area ratio.
FIGURE 10.
Evolution of the discharge/irrigated area ratio (l/s/ha).
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Cost of Water
The various sources of water used by Jalalabad
through the years can be compared in economic
terms, with regard to both the investment and
operational costs. This provides hints on the
financial efforts that the state or villagers were
ready to make in order to keep water supply in
line with demand and population growth.
It is, of course, very difficult to assess the
investments in the digging and maintenance of
the qanats along centuries. As a proxy of
maintenance costs, we may take the ongoing
work aimed at furthering the galleries, which
corresponds more or less to what is needed to
counterbalance the decline in discharge by
increasing the drainage area. This work (at the
moment paid by the state) of 4 million tumans/
year compared with a discharge of 100 l/s gives
a cost of 1.9 tumans/m3. (Since 1,000 tumans
amount to one Euro, the following costs are
given in tumans and can easily be converted.)
This can be compared with the “spot-market”
price of one hour of water right (4.6 tumans/m3),
which, however, now also includes the
contribution of the Nekouabad water.
These costs have first increased with the
operation of wells. The actual cost of a 60-meter
deep well, with its horizontal drainage galleries, is
estimated at 25 million tumans,25 which
corresponds to an investment of 60 tumans/m3 of
water made available per year. To this must be
added 15 tumans/m3 for the later shift from
diesel to electric pumps. Operational costs are
very low because of the subsidized rate of rural
electricity26: as mentioned earlier, they were 8
tumans/m3 with diesel motors, and are now 3
tumans/m3 with the shift to electricity.
The price of water from the Nekouabad canal
is of the same order of magnitude (4 tumans/m3)
and the sunk costs (6.4 tumans/m3 made
available each year) are also limited (but this is
the part paid only by farmers). Comparatively, the
new dam constructed in the village to collect
lateral runoff and capture the residual water of
the Mourhab amounts to an investment27 of 360
tumans/m3 of stored water. This shows how relief
measures decided at the height of the drought
are extremely political and favor emergency/relief
considerations over economic aspects.
Last, the cost of the Khamiran dam was
estimated at 53 million tumans (1990) and that of
the feeder canal filling it at 64 million tumans
(1991). If we consider the cost of the irrigation
canals and the feeder canal to be of the same
order of magnitude it gives us around 1.57 billion
tumans in actualized value (2001). The cost of
the cubic meter made available per year is
therefore very high (274 tumans/m3).
It is also interesting to compare these costs
with those of the water brought by tankers, which
the villagers bought at 700 tumans/m3 during the
most critical period of the last drought.
Table 1 summarizes all these costs.
Investment costs are given in tumans/m3 made
available each year (on average), without
considering the life duration of each source. It is
important to stress that these values are orders
of magnitude rather than accurate numbers,
because actualization of the costs was not very
Cost of Land and Water and Gross Agricultural Incomes
25But only 5 million tumans for the main pit, galleries being added gradually.
26The costs of electricity (per Kwh) are as follows: 19 rials for agriculture, 112 rials for domestic use, 168 rials for general use and 215 rials for
industrial use (rounded values).
27We have considered here that the dam would, on average, fill up to only a fourth of its capacity (based on last year’s observations); even if
we double this value, the investment cost remains very high.
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precise. However, they suffice to show big
differences between sources. The table shows
that the Khamiran dam and the water-harvesting
dams were very expensive ventures. In the
former case, the cost to the farmers is very low
because of the subsidies implicit in the non-
charging of sunk costs and O&M expenditures.
Canal water is also subsidized, and its
investment costs underrated.
TABLE 1.
Comparative costs of sources of water (tumans/m3, or  10-3/m3, 2001 values).
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Price of Land
The price of land is extremely variable depending
on the location, the presence of fruit trees and
whether water rights are attached to it and sold
altogether or not. One hectare is worth only 2
million tumans in the upper part of the village (well
sector), but 11 million tumans near the village,
where gas, electricity and other facilities are
available. The price of a hectare of land is 15
million tumans in the core sector but only 5 million
tumans in the mazrae qadim, and 4 million tumans
in the Surkhan sector near the road. This is the
price of bare land: if trees are planted, the cost is
much higher, depending on the type and age of the
trees. For almond trees, for example, the 1,000
trees to be found in one hectare are worth 8,000–
9,000 tumans each (for fully developed trees),
amounting to 8–9 million tumans/hectare, more
than the price of most plots.
Cost of Production and Return
The different costs for accessing water can be
compared with estimates of agricultural income.
As is common, the benefits drawn from the
different crops are in direct proportion to the
investment costs and of risk (both for production
and marketing).
Almonds. Generally, 90 to 100 almond trees are
planted in one jerib.28 The yield and the price
depend on the variety. The mormakha variety is
more expensive than pistachio itself and fetches
5,000 tumans/kg of dried almonds, but each tree
produces only 2 kilograms. The mamaye and rebi
varieties fetch much lower prices (1,500 and
1,200 tumans/kg, respectively) but are less
sensitive to pests and produce almost twice
more. The gross benefit of one jerib of rebi can
be taken at 200,000 tumans, and the net benefit
at around 170,000 tumans.29
28One jerib is one tenth of a hectare, and is the unit commonly used in the village.
29Not including family labor. Labor exchange is very common but extra labor is needed for land preparation and harvest. Wage laborers (often
Afghans) are paid 3,500 to 4,000 tumans per day, which can be compared to the amount of 5,000 tumans paid in the construction sector.
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Pomegranate trees. Pomegranate trees require
very little input and are very drought-resistant
(they can stand 18 days without irrigation). They
produce 100 t/ha (10 t/jerib)  yielding a gross
income of 150,000 tumans/year/jerib, or 100,000
tumans after deducting costs.
Cereals. Barley is sold at only 100 tumans/kg.
Yields vary with the availability of water but an
average can be taken at 600 kg/jerib, giving a
gross product of only 60,000 tumans. The
corresponding gross income for wheat is 68,000
tumans (or around 60,000 tumans in net value,
family labor not computed).
Other fruits. Fruit trees such as cherry, plum or
apricot yield a better income but are sensitive to
water stress. They need water every 6 days,
while almonds may stand a frequency of 12
days. Walnuts are also offered high prices but
the yield is uncertain, depending notably on frost.
Under the present conditions of water scarcity,
there are only a few trees, which are reserved
for home-consumption. The profitability of a good
garden is exemplified by half a hectare of
orchard planted with high-quality walnut trees and
miscellaneous trees, which brought its owner a
net benefit of 5 million tumans/year.
Overall, it can be seen that the magnitude of
per hectare income is around 600,000 tumans for
cereals and 1–2 million tumans for fruit trees
(with higher values however for high-value fruits
such as walnuts, or peach, cherries, etc., usually
cultivated in small quantities). This can be
compared to the cost of water: if we consider an
application of between 5,000 and 15,000 m3/ha,
the total (variable) cost of water from the canal/
qanat or wells (taken here at 4 tumans/m3) is
between 20,000 and 60,000 tumans, a small
fraction of the farm income (under 10%).
A typical qanat water right is half an hour/
jerib, which is sold at 360,000 tumans (12,000
tumans/minute), which means from 1 to 6 years
of agricultural income from that jerib. Qanat
water is relatively cheap compared to land (with
barren land in inner gardens at 5 to 15 million
tumans/jerib), in particular because the supply
from wells is higher than that from the qanat.
Land and Water Transactions
Because of the individuation of land and water
rights in the village, the relative easiness in
reallocating given amounts of water spatially and
the close social bonds between villagers, water
transactions are quite frequent.
Transactions within a Sector
The most common transaction is between dong-
fellows. A farmer who, for example, is harvesting
one plot may choose to “lend” his right to
another farmer who needs more water, and who
will return it at a later opportunity. The borrowing
farmer may respect the order of the successive
operations and just direct the “borrowed” flow to
his own plot. If his plot is distant, however, which
will happen, for example, if his time slot within
the 12-hour period is quite a long time before or
after that of the lender, then he will incur
significant losses in time and in infiltration. He
may therefore choose to inform the farmers
whose turns fall between their two turns that he
wishes to shift their time in order to concentrate
two water rights on his plot. If his plot is located
downstream of the lender’s, then those
concerned farmers will be asked to shift their
irrigation back by the amount of time he
borrowed. If his plot is located upstream of the
lender’s, then the successive farmers will have to
delay their starting time by the same period of
time. In that particular case, however, the
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problem is easier to resolve because the farmer
will just have to divert the existing flow at some
point further upstream. He will have to deduct
from his time-right the time taken by water to
make its way to the point where it had been
interrupted but this is quicker since the canal is
already wet. The most common case, however,
is that of exchanges between neighbors. Since
gardens are irrigated every two to four 6-day
turns and other crops each with one or two
turns, depending on the heat and the month,
farmers cede their rights when they do not
irrigate and add their neighbors’ rights to their
own when they irrigate.
A second (rare) case may occur when a
farmer has plots in both the upstream and
downstream lots of the dong. This may happen if
he has bought some land or married a woman
endowed with land in the other lot. In that case,
he may shift a right, say one hour, of one lot to
the other but he has to incur the burden and
losses associated with directing the flow to a
remote plot. (Only the Kaley Sefid dong enjoys
more flexibility, since all farmers’ plots are in the
middle lot). Transfers from one dong to another
are not possible because they would disrupt the
whole division in lots of 12 hours.30
Transactions between Sectors
The dong-fellows generally have land in all six
sectors, which increases the work needed for
water management and also allows the
reallocation of water from one sector to another.
Two farmers of the same dong may exchange
water on the same day (as opposed to the
preceding case where the borrower returns water
on a subsequent day), since a given farmer will
have his irrigation operations concentrated on the
day attributed to his dong.31 One hour can be
given to a dong-fellow in one sector and
compensated for by one hour received in another
sector. Typically, this happens during drought
when farmers choose to concentrate the meager
flow into some particular gardens.
Types of Transaction
The above examples refer to on-the-spot
swapping operations that allow both flexibility in
the reallocation of water and a better response to
varying and spatially distributed crop
requirements. If one farmer is not interested in
an exchange he may simply sell or buy a right
for one rotation. This happens frequently and the
price is usually 2,000–2,500 tumans/hour. During
the peak of the drought, however, the price was
observed to reach 4,000 tumans/hour for a
discharge that was almost one-fourth of the usual
discharge, which corresponds to an increase of
700 to 800 percent that well-illustrates the shift in
the marginal value of water.
These reallocations can also be agreed upon
for a longer period. For example, the owner of a
garden destroyed by the drought may choose to
wait for a year or two before planting new trees.
More often he will use the freed water on his
other plots but if he is a resident of Najafabad or
absentee owner he may simply rent out his right
to a dong-fellow for a season or two. The price is
calculated on the basis of the time of one hour
multiplied by the number of rotations per year
(approximately 40). The purchaser has to inform
his dong-fellows about the transaction, so that
time slots may be rearranged to allow the
concentration of rights on his plot.
Well water rights are also ceded for one year
at a price of 20,000 tumans/hour of right.
The transfer can also be permanent. The
water-right owner can simply transfer his right to
30This only happens between plots that belong to two successive and adjacent dongs.
31If he has plots in several dongs which, again, can occur because of marriage or land purchase, he will have to be present on the field on
several days.
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a purchaser by declaring the transaction to the
Qanat Committee,32 where it will be duly
registered. However, the transaction can only be
between members of the same dong and within
the same sector, so as not to disrupt the
apportion of one day per dong. The price of one
minute of qanat water (now increased by canal
water) is 12,000 tumans. It must be noted that
the water right is not attached to land. In effect,
several owners have sold their water rights after
the drought and let their land fallow, while
retaining ownership on it (which can be a good
strategy, since the built-up area of the village is
expanding). Land, of course, is generally sold
with its water right attached but not necessarily
so. With the abandoning of many gardens during
the drought, twenty cessions of water rights,
mostly of farmers residing in Najafabad, were
recorded. An hour of right to well water can also
be sold, at the price of 800,000 tumans (or 40
times its value for one season). It must be noted
that this price is lower, around 600,000 tumans,
when the land is sold concomitantly (at a price
that varies, as mentioned earlier).
Although transactions are frequent they are
limited by several factors. Often, farmers have
several plots planted to different crops in the
same section and rebalance demand and supply
within their own set of plots. Planting cereals
alongside a permanent garden is a good water-
management strategy because these winter crops
need water in spring, while gardens will require
more water during summer. When water gets
really scarce, farmers may choose either to
spread it over the totality of their plots, or to
concentrate it on some plots, on some parts of a
given plot, or on given crops (for example,
pomegranate trees can stand two rotations without
water, that is, 18 days, while other trees cannot).
It is also noteworthy that only the right
expressed in terms of time is registered. The
succession of irrigation operations and other
internal arrangements are not written down. They
are sanctioned by custom and do not give rise to
any conflict. Only buying/selling transactions are
recorded. Interestingly, the transfer by
inheritance, by far the most common, does not
result in such records. The Islamic law, which
governs the distribution of inheritance to children
by granting one part to a female and two parts to
a male, is generally applied. Most villagers
therefore do not have personal documents that
directly show their ownership of land or water but
they are all able to exhibit the initial document
given to their ancestor by Sarey Modulay in the
beginning of the twentieth century. The portion of
this land inherited by a particular individual after
several generations, plus the derived land on the
more recent sectors, are said to be well known
by all and is never questioned. This striking self-
regulating aspect of land- and water-rights
application and transactions, with no felt need for
a centralized control, gives a measure of the
centrality of such rights in village life. The
recognition and individuation of rights are
probably a result of the large (private)
investments required to mobilize water resources,
either through qanats or through wells (Spooner
1974a).
It is important to understand that the initial
land and water rights, as codified in 1935,
determine all the further developments made
based on the qanat water, as well as on
whatever water source is added to it, including
wells, which are rightly seen as partly feeding on
the same resource. These rights have been of
course modified and fragmented by inheritance
and sales, including sales to outsiders. This has
engendered a dual system of land property,
whereby a plot can be bought either with or
without a “right to extension.” In the former case,
the purchaser will be considered as a core-sector
32This committee is nominated by the Village Council, which has 6 members elected by the population every 4 years.
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shareholder and will get shares of land in any
further development/extension that uses qanat
water. In the latter case, he will remain the
owner of the part of his water right that will be
directed to a possible newly opened area but not
of the corresponding land share. This land, on
the contrary, will be allotted to the former owner
of his plot, who kept his right to extension. In
practice, the owner of the new plot without water
and the owner of the water share without land
are led to strike a deal, so that one will sell his
asset to the other (the transaction may also
involve a third party). As a result of this
distinction in right, the price of land “with
extension” is 50 percent higher than the price
without it. Land transactions are registered in
front of witnesses and receive the seal of the
Village Council. Water-rights deals, in contrast,
are merely noted down in a book by the Qanat
Committee.
Land- and Water-Rights Linkages
The development of the mazrae qadim and
sourkha sectors was the result of a perceived
excess of water and, since the right to ownership
of these possible extensions had been specified
in the initial land grants, villagers gained
ownership of the new irrigated lands.
In contrast, the more recent development of
the mazrae jadid on the right bank of the river
and the reallocation of a fraction of the two parts
of water allocated to the core sector were not
due to a perceived excess of water but to a
strategy to occupy and appropriate land. A
crucial aspect of the politics of water in the
village is the actual law on land. Villagers may
occupy and reclaim barren land within the limit of
the village, and can claim ownership of the land
after demonstrating that within 2 years they can
turn it green (or use it for some other productive
use, such as chicken farming, industries, etc.).
This, of course, necessitates finding access to a
source of water. At present, the most common
situations or cases are those where a) some
water-rights holders reallocate their water
spatially because the original use is no more
possible (typically the encroachment of Najafabad
city upon its old gardens: see next section; b)
some people are granted permits to dig wells; c)
water-rights holders decide to spread their water
over a larger area; and d) state-sponsored
projects may tap resources on which the state
has control, notably the Zayandeh Rud water
diverted to the irrigation canal system. The
second case is exemplified by the two areas in
the village irrigated exclusively with wells, while
the third case is illustrated by the successive
expansions from the core sector to the three
added ones. The fourth case is exemplified
below by the project of development of the
village highlands.
The law, however, does not confine this right
to villagers alone. Outside investors and also the
state can make use of their right to occupy land.
The lack of definition of “groundwater rights”
makes it possible for particular individuals to be
granted permits to dig wells. The rule that forbids
digging or drilling a well within a radius of 500
meters of a preexisting well may not be strictly
adhered to, and it is also too crude to prevent
third-party impact on all hydrological situations, in
particular on qanats. Having heard of government
projects to occupy the area upstream of the
village (the vicinity of the ruins of the old village,
which is also the drainage area of the two
qanats), the villagers decided to first occupy the
stretch of land along the river (mazrae jadid), the
closest to the village and also the part to which
the qanat water could be more easily diverted.
This was done by planting almond trees and by
constructing, at their cost (14 million tumans), a
canal receiving water directly from the outlet of
the main qanat (before the transfer, via siphon,
of its water to the other bank of the river). The
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qanat flow was redivided, from four into five
parts, and the 180 hectares of the new sector
were apportioned to the 450 shareholders33 in
proportion to their water rights in the core area.
This, of course, reduced the per jerib discharge
in the whole area and entailed an untimely
weakening of water security just before the
drought. In order to occupy and secure the land
located further upstream, they also planned to
develop drip irrigation in that area but were not
given the permits for the two wells that would
have been necessary. This was done with the full
understanding that the wells would most probably
affect their own qanat, but was judged preferable
to waiting for somebody else to be granted a
permit.
Recent developments showed that this
premonition was not baseless. The villagers got
the information that a joint venture between
investors of Najafabad and a foreign company to
produce flowers in greenhouses for export was
being planned and that the area of production
could be located in the disputed area. This
strengthened the determination of the villagers,
notwithstanding a sense of resignation that led
one farmer to comment “they would end up
without water and working as employees for
‘them’.”
Another way to capture water is to activate
political support34 and links with line agencies to
propose and push for development projects that
may tap state-controlled resources, such as the
water supplied to irrigation by main canals. Such
claims are usually supported by equity
considerations put forward by people whose
villages are not located in areas that benefited
from earlier large-scale development projects.
This, however, may be risky as the following
example will show.
Seven years ago, the village was promised a
discharge of 200 l/s, to be pumped from the
Nekouabad right bank main canal35 to irrigate
3,000 hectares of good soil located in the
mountain that overtops the village. Villagers
invested 60 million tumans in land development
out of the 170 million requested before realizing
that the project was not forthcoming. While they
had been promised that the 170 million would be
paid by the Ministry in exchange for the land
(worth 270 million) occupied by an electric station
south of the village,36 the whole project collapsed
with the outbreak of the drought. Villagers had
formed an association of 1,100 members37 who
were ready to invest in the new venture and had
accepted to relinquish their rights to land for the
benefit of the government, on the promise that
they would be granted ownership after 2 years of
cultivation. With water not forthcoming, irrigation
and agriculture became impossible and the land
rights remained with the government. The project
would have incurred significant costs for
adduction but the villagers were ready to pay for
the 450 million tumans needed (7 years ago).
Costs are now estimated at 1.2 billion tumans
and there is no news about the 200 l/s originally
targeted for the village since the drought has
33Because of the division of land, more people were actually concerned but they remained under the representative of the family for the sake
of simplicity.
34For example, the former Minister of Information was born in Jalalabad; the Minister of Agriculture is from the Najafabad district, etc.
35Before the revolution (1979), and probably after the construction of the Nekouabad left bank main canal in 1970, at a distance of 10 kilometers,
there were already projects to bring water from the canal (that is from the Zayandeh Rud) through a pipe. Another project was to bring water
from the Chadegan dam, which was realized only in the 1990s but which eventually failed.
36As mentioned by one villager, “it is not easy for the Ministry of Energy to pay money but it is easy to give water.” This intuition hints at the
power of the ministry to allocate water without close scrutiny on third-party impacts, because of the absence of a quantitative definition of
water rights.
37Since the new land was not supposed to be developed based on the qanat water, the benefit of the project was not confined to ancient
rights holders but opened to all. Altogether, 110 individuals without ancient rights applied for land in this project.
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shown how scarce water could be. Faced with
such a gridlock, villagers have decided to hire a
lawyer to take their case to court. It is worth
noting that farmers are well aware of the
competition for the Zayandeh Rud water (through
the Nekouabad canal) and that the rush for
securing an allotment of water is seen as a
critical and strategic move in the context of a
total basin closure. Interestingly, they are also
aware that the Zayandeh Rud water is being
piped out of the basin to the cities of Yazd, and
in the future to Kashan,38 and are convinced that
this would not have been possible if they had
“bought” the water of the Nekouabad canal in
time.
Another example also well illustrates the
mobility of land and water rights. The
encroachment of Najafabad city upon its old
garden area has freed a part of the water supply
coming from the 17 qanat collector (now
allegedly flowing to the Zayandeh Rud), and
rights holders, with the help39 of the Department
of Agriculture of the district, have planned to use
part of this water to develop 3,000 hectares of
almond trees in the middle of the valley.
However, with the drought, the collector’s
discharge was reduced from 1 m3/s to a tenth of
this value, with 12 out of the 17 qanats having
dried up. Only 850 hectares have been planted
so far but shareholders are expected to be
granted the authorization to dig one well for each
of the dry qanats, which will compound the
overall decline of groundwater resources. It must
be noted that the strategy of Najafabad’s
landowners is not only to make productive use of
their water rights (a share of the collector's
discharge) but also to get access to land, whose
value is likely to increase in the future. Since
whoever is demonstrating that he can turn barren
public land green is granted ownership,
Najafabad gardeners were able to get hold of a
land 30 kilometers distant by reallocating part of
their water rights.
All these examples show the diversity of
strategies to access land by spreading water use
or to access water by spreading land use. They
involve different actors, villagers, investors and
various government agencies, and result in a
constant redefinition of the land and
waterscapes. These issues and their implication
for allocation and rights are examined more
closely in the following section.
38Qom, a very thirsty city too, is also mentioned but it seems that official plans are to divert water from another basin.
39A share of 20 percent of the investment is paid by the government while the rest is to be paid by the farmers.
Hydrology and Water Rights: Lessons Drawn and the Challenges
Faced
The Quest for Water
Several important lessons can be drawn from the
story of Jalalabad. The first one is the ingenuity
deployed by villagers for centuries to tap the
water resources necessary for life and
agriculture. This applies first to the development
of the qanats. The development of the
Jahanabad qanat has been quasi-continuous;
branches have been made longer and deeper,
connections with riverbeds or deeper aquifers
established and siphons or aqueducts
constructed across rivers. Surface water was
diverted to different fields, depending on its
abundance, or trapped so that it may infiltrate
and recharge local aquifers. Surface water has
also been recently stored in a lateral reservoir,
which is also a water-harvesting device aimed at
recharging groundwater. Villagers have developed
hybrids between wells and qanats to take
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advantage of power-driven pumping devices.
They have struggled to obtain additional water
from the state, through pipe connections to the
Nekouabad right bank irrigation canal, lobbied for
similar projects in order to occupy and develop
the highlands of the village, or struggled to get a
share from the Khamiran dam. As we have seen
above, new challenges to the control of water are
still appearing.
These endeavors on the supply side have
been paralleled by efforts on the demand side,
including water transactions, blending of crops
with staggered requirements, establishment and
use of furrows instead of flood irrigation during
the drought, concentration of water rights, etc.
Socio-Hydrologic Breakdown
The second lesson is the evidence of the
breakdown of the delicate balance between the
hydrological cycle and the uses of water in the
valley. This breakdown happened in two steps:
first, the development of wells, second the
construction of the Khamiran dam.
After the nationalization of water resources in
1968, the growing intervention of the state came
together with a modernist ethos, whereby
traditional village irrigation was considered as
primitive, backward and inefficient (McLachlan
1988; Ehlers and Saidi 1989). Modernization
required technology and modern water-lifting
devices, and the development of pumps and
wells was considered very advantageous
compared with qanats, because the fluctuating
discharge of the latter was considered to hinder
agriculture. This considerably boosted the
expansion of wells which started in the late
1950s. While in the 1950s the contribution of
tube wells was negligible and existing qanats
were providing 60 percent of all supplies and
serving 1,200,000 hectares of irrigated land in
the whole of Iran, by the mid-1970s wells were
already providing 8 billion m3 against 9 billion m3
by qanats (McLachlan 1988).
Qanat discharges are determined by the
height of the water table, which determines the
length of the water-bearing section (Beaumont
1989). Wells, in contrast, ensure a more or less
constant discharge irrespective of the water table
depth (at least in a certain range and in the short
term) and this flow can be increased by galleries
and the use of more powerful pumps. They are
not only hardly sensitive to variations in the
groundwater stocks but may also abstract more
water out of the aquifer than it comes in as
recharge. The “mining” of aquifers has little short-
term impact but proves unsustainable after a few
years, especially when a drought occurs, as we
have seen earlier.
The history of the destruction of qanats by
wells is documented by several studies (e.g.,
Ehlers and Saidi 1989) and well illustrated by the
Najafabad valley, as well as by the Borkhar area:
the qanats of the Borkhar area, a flourishing
cultivated area north of Esfahan, were destroyed
by the ensuing spread of deep wells sunk to
irrigate summer crops and orchards (Lambton
1969). This does not mean, however, that wells
should have been disregarded, nor outlawed from
the outset. It is likely that, in some areas, the
potential of groundwater was higher than what
the qanats were extracting. For the Najafabad
valley for example, if we ascribe to each of the
106 qanats of the valley the average discharge
of 32 l/s found by Hartl (1989) for a sample of
these qanats, we arrive at a total discharge of
approximately 3.5 m3/s. It is probable that wells
have been used to tap more available resources
but insufficient control of their number and
location eventually led to competition with the
qanats.
The second fatal step was the construction
of the Khamiran dam, probably based on the
common (yet radically wrong in that context) idea
that surface storage is beneficial because it may
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regulate water that would otherwise flow
downstream untapped and non-beneficially. In
effect, traditional water sources (spring and
qanats) feed on the huge natural water-storage
facility provided by the alluvial aquifer of the
valley. This natural reservoir has overwhelming
advantages over a dam: a) it incurs no loss by
evaporation; b) it is distributed all along the
valley, allowing access to almost all villages; c)
this distribution is free and requires no
intervention; and d) water use had been quite
finely attuned to the resource.
The failure to fully appreciate these
advantages probably paved the way for a
decision which had all the attires of a modernist
solution (engineering- and technology-oriented,
capital-intensive and state-controlled) but
produced disastrous effects. With the diversion of
the Mourhab, as it has been mentioned earlier,
the constant replenishment of this distributed
reservoir was interrupted and water concentrated
in one point; the intervention incurred high capital
costs; the balance of supply and use was
disrupted; the reservoir undergoes evaporation
losses; earlier investments in affected wells and
qanats were cancelled; traditional rights were
impaired and access effectively redistributed;
those who received water had to pay for it;
allocation became unclear and users lost control
over it; and the ecology of the river was fatally
impacted.
Conflicting Legal Repertoires
The third lesson is the interference of the state
and the confusion of legal repertoires. The Civil
Code, following the Islamic Law, gives priority to
established owners of land over newcomers and
upstream over downstream users of water. Prior
appropriation rights were protected by a clause
stipulating that the use of water by newcomers
should not impact on the interest of existing
users. The need to protect springs, wells and
qanats was addressed by defining a harim, or a
prohibited area for extraction around these
sources. A Qanat Law for the protection and
construction of qanats was enacted in 1930
under Reza Shah but it did not have much effect.
The law predated the introduction of power-
operated deep or semi-deep wells and was not
updated to deal with these new developments.
McLachlan (1988) reports that the “legal
frameworks from Islamic Law and the Civil Code
that surrounded water use were powerfully
supplemented by customary practices (‘urf)…
These local regulations governed to a large
degree the access to, and use of, water in
irrigation within what was a complex organization
of supply in an uncertain physical environment.”
The nationalization of water resources was
introduced in 1967 as the tenth point of the
“White Revolution” and Regional Boards were
established to assess and control water use and
to charge consumption. The state thus gained
wide power of control and taxation of private/
communal ownership.40 In several instances, the
state took over the management of minor
schemes and abolished customary rights, with
mixed results (Lambton 1969; Ghazi 2003), but
this seems to have happened on a case-by-case
basis. Water management in the Najafabad
valley was apparently not altered.
All in all, the right to groundwater, as
regulated by the granting of permits by state
authorities, became a state affair and was
administered centrally, with limited knowledge of
local hydrology, transparency, and control by
interested populations. Regulation of the diversion
of surface water, too, became insulated from
40As usual, this measure seems to have been justified by the alleged ability of water fees to control “wasteful application” and induce shifts
from subsistence to commercial crops, a rhetoric endorsed uncritically by McLachian (1988). Water charges, in fact, remained as politically
acceptable levels and were never high enough to induce such shifts (see Perry 2001). In the words of McLachian (1988), “with this income
the disincentives to the official agencies of supplying water to the irrigation sector were removed.”
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stakeholders. Instead of the mirab whose actions
had to be patent and who enforced rights
sanctioned by tradition, now the state allocates
water with little recourse available to users to
question this allocation. For example, the share
of water going to Askaran, the most upstream
village, is defined by the regulation of a hydraulic
structure, which can be tampered with and which
may easily be subject to local arrangements
between operators and the villagers. Likewise, 2
years after the drought, most villages are still not
receiving the agreed-upon discharge from the
dam (or from the Nekouabad canal, as for the
case of Jalalabad), despite conditions in the dam
having returned to normal. No insurance or
reasons are given that discharges will be
restored to their initial values. In a similar
fashion, the redistribution of water in the
Najafabad Valley after the construction of the
Khamiran dam was a non-transparent process
with no direct participation of the population
concerned. The village of Khamiran, for example,
could divert 30 l/s from the Mourhab and 50 l/s
from its qanats. Both sources have dried up after
the construction of the dam and they now pay 2
million tumans for a discharge of 40 l/s from the
dam, unilaterally reduced to 20-25 l/s during the
drought.
This situation is also illustrated by the
Zayandeh Rud itself. With the superposition of
concrete canals over the network of ancient
maadi, the state has largely overridden the
riparian rights enshrined in the sixteenth century
document attributed to Sheikh Bahai. Despite
some modification in the 1930s, when rice
cultivation was temporarily banned, this
regulation had been enforced for centuries and
its enactment, in spite of its official seal, had
been done in what would nowadays be termed
“stakeholder” consultation and participation. The
introduction of the edict states that
(…) “the competent authorities of the State
should appoint a few persons of the reliable and
aged men to establish, under the signatures of
the exalted and honourable mostawfis and the
confirmation of the kadkhodas and rish-safids of
the boluks [districts], which share the water of
the Zayandeh Rud, honestly and to the best of
their knowledge, the shares and lot of each
village and hamlet in each boluk, according to its
capacity and need, and to enter in the registers
under guarantee, so that regulation (of the
waters) should be put into execution” (Lambton
1953).
Another ancient source quoted by Spooner
(1974a) stresses that the mirab “must prevent
the powerful from trespassing on the weak with
regard to the shares of water,” and referee water
disputes “with the confirmation and approval” of
the local leaders. In sum, the situation at the
moment is one in which the state controls large-
scale irrigation networks as well as groundwater
permits, more often than not in conflict with
traditional rights. Interestingly, however, these are
not fully abolished, judging from the way water is
taxed. Farmers who draw water from two maadi
near the Kaley (head) bridge, for example, get
water from the first one free but pay for water
from the second. The reason is that the first
maadi branches off the Zayandeh Rud a few
hundred meters upstream of the bridge, while the
second branches off a few meters downstream of
it. Since the rights defined by Sheikh Bahai
applied only to maadis diverting water after the
bridge, the upstream diversion is disregarded and
not taxed. Likewise, the price of the Khamiran
dam water supplied to the different villages,
which also depends upon whether the village
formerly held rights or not, is higher if the village
had no rights! It is ironical in some sense that
while overriding ancient rights, the state keeps
referring to them for the only purpose of taxation.
This can be seen as a compromise between
preexisting rights and the complete redefinition of
rights.
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Robbing Yadullah’s Water…or the
Tricky Logic of Closed Basins
The last and most important lesson to be learned
is that in a closed basin any local increase in
water abstraction, be it from surface water or
underground water, is likely to decrease the
supply of another user somewhere else in the
basin. Because the closure of river basins results
in a growing interdependence of the users within
the basin, one must carefully analyze how the
paths of the different surface-water and
underground flows are interrelated and how any
local intervention that modifies the quantity, quality
or timing of one of these flows impacts the whole
system. What is stored, conserved or depleted at
one point dictates what is available at another
point, further downstream (Molle 2003). Whenever
an individual, a village or the state taps a new
source of water or alter the allocation of an
existing one, it is tantamount, in reality, to a mere
reallocation: in other words, one may be almost
sure to be robbing Yadullah’s water to irrigate
Saeid’s garden. The spatial and temporal features
of these implicit or explicit reallocations (and the
identification of who wins and who loses) are often
tricky and sometimes unexpected. Several
examples, found at nested levels, can be drawn
from the preceding discussion.
The prime example is of course that of wells
which deplete local aquifers. Well development is
tantamount, at least partially, to a reallocation of
water from qanat (sometimes spring) owners to
the well owners. These owners may be the same
persons, as in the case of the development of
the right-bank well sector, which has dried up the
Aliabad qanat. But they may also be very
different people. The flower-farm project
upstream of Jalalabad would entail the
reallocation of water from villagers to a capitalist
joint venture between investors of Najafabad and
a foreign company.
The development of wells in lateral valleys
also reduces the groundwater flow to
downstream areas. Farmers understand that
groundwater is not a static resource and the
issue is “pumping water before it flows
downstream,” as one of them expressed. The
same also applies to surface water, with the new
reservoir that captures any possible flow in the
Mourhab (part of it, however, is reinjected locally
into the aquifer by infiltration).
The construction of the dam is a good
example of storing the surface water (in the
reservoir), which used to diffuse to the valley
aquifer and be distributed all over it, to further
reallocate it only to some villages. The result of
the dam, together with the wells and the qanats,
is probably a drastic, although invisible, reduction
of the groundwater flow to the Zayandeh Rud
itself, since water is “retained” in the valley. This
flow formerly contributed to the recharge of the
river and to the amount of water used
downstream for irrigation. According to
groundwater balances of the Najafabad Valley, 28
percent of current water use is unsustainable
(mining of groundwater resources), and only 9
percent of groundwater leaves the basin,
presumably for the main valley (Morid 2003).
Although early rights focused on the river, the
overall balance between demand and supply that
resulted from these rules, in fact, implicitly
incorporated these underground flows.
Along the Zayandeh Rud itself, of course,
water supply has been dramatically changed by
the Chadegan dam and the successive tunnels,
while demand increased with the expansion of
irrigation and other uses. However, there are
numerous examples of reallocation. The upper
reach of the river, for example, comprises a
narrow and steep-sided valley but numerous
pumping stations abstract water and supply it to
almond orchards located on the plateau, and
equipped with drip-irrigation they supply it to
locations sometimes 150 meters higher than the
river! These orchards are estimated at 10,000
hectares (IWMI and AREO 2004) and are now
developing on a large scale and, in the absence
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of formal rights, they only deplete the resource
that was to be used downstream.
A less-obvious example of reallocation is
provided by the development of large “green
belts” around the city, along the ring-road. These
trees have allegedly been planted “for the
environment,” that is, to help greening the city
surroundings. They are generally irrigated by
drippers and water is sourced from deep wells. A
vague feeling seems to prevail that this is done
using underground water that was more or less
waiting to be tapped. In reality, this underground
water is flowing towards the river and is also
contributing to the base flow of the river. Again,
the impact is on downstream irrigators and the
environment. This example shows how water for
agriculture can be reallocated almost “invisibly” to
provide amenities to city dwellers (and urban-
based decision makers). A more visible variant of
this is the direct pumping from the Zayandeh
Rud river to irrigate the University Campus, the
zoo and its surrounding park.
Canal lining also increases local use to the
detriment of return flow users. The Najafabad’s
collector, that follows the valley, has been lined,
increasing the flow to Najafabad but reducing
groundwater recharge. This also applies to the
canal that distributes qanat water in Jalalabad:
the benefit is local (less losses and less costs to
pump water back to the fields), but subsurface
flows are reduced.
The upstream/downstream and surface/
underground are complex and sometimes yield
counterintuitive consequences. For example,
Jalalabad farmers may be upset by the fact that
farmers in Nezhatabad, one but the last village to
be supplied by the Khamiran dam, receives
enough water to grow rice, while they were not
granted a share of the dam (paddy fields usually
dry up in a lapse of time of between half a day
and three days and, therefore, diversion to these
fields is very high). In fact, these losses are very
beneficial to them since they replenish the
aquifer that flows downstream towards their
village (although the benefit is probably
significantly reduced by the wells that locally
recycle part of this infiltrated water).
Pumping from the Nekouabad canal is also
attractive. A discharge of 400 l/s is delivered to
users in the Jalalabad area, but there are several
other users. For example, generally, factories
have no problem in getting supply from the canal
since their demand is seemingly limited and the
Ministry of Power can sell water to them at a
much higher price. Since the canal is allotted a
given amount of water and has a capacity limited
by design, the combined impact of these
diversions is to reduce supply to agriculture.
In general terms, water use is becoming
more and more local, as users increasingly tap
water resources (surface water and underground
water) closer to their source. Consequently, basin
flows are reduced with the exception of the
supply of the Chadegan dam. However, for each
increase in supply, there seems to be a host of
demands and water-use projects are waiting to
be implemented.
The study thus provides a handful of
instructive and graphic examples of how water
gets redistributed:
• From underground to underground (wells
impacting on qanats and springs).
• From surface to surface (the Nekouabad
canal water piped to Jalalabad).
• From surface to underground (diversion
of Mourhab water and harvesting lateral
runoff into a storage dam that recharges
local aquifers in Jalalabad).
• From underground to surface (the aquifer
recharges along the Mourhab now
transformed into stored surface water;
the seepage of Najafabad’s adductor
transformed into [increased] surface
supply through canal lining).
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• From underground/surface to surface/
underground flow (lateral aquifers were
contributing to the base flow of the
Zayandeh Rud; the river now recharges
the lateral aquifers).
If these interventions induce hydrological
changes, they also work across scales, and
across levels of social and political control. The
excavation of tunnels has introduced trans-basin
diversions into the basin; the construction of the
Chadegan reservoir and the modern irrigation
schemes have transformed the hydrological
regime of the Zayandeh Rud that, in turn, has
changed the underground flow between the main
and lateral valleys. These flows have been, and
still are, altered by overabstraction of
groundwater by wells that, in turn, have affected
qanats and springs, and the surface lateral flows
to the river. This interconnectedness across
scales has critical implication for societies, since
they link macro-level management and decision
making to local processes. The corresponding
establishment of multilevel governance patterns
is a challenge (not specific to the Zayandeh Rud
basin) that is bound to take several decades to
be addressed effectively.
As exemplified earlier, while some
interventions, such as the diversion to main
irrigation schemes, are well quantified, the overall
web of interactions is not, and many of these
interventions have consequences rendered
invisible both by the hydrologic complexity and by
the year-to-year variability of flows, which mask
long-term trends. A wet year is likely to pop up
and show that resources are abundant, or at
least sufficient, to satisfy users; but a dry year,
or a drought, is all the more likely, in turn, to
show that resources are overcommitted and the
slack needed to absorb or dampen irregularities
is lacking.
Another consequence of the closing of a river
basin cannot be overemphasized. Since all water
resources in the basin are committed, water
savings at the basin level are logically
impossible. Local conservation measures are
possible but they necessarily have third-party
impacts, be it on other users, next generations
(mining of aquifers) or on the environment. This
evidence is still not fully appreciated by decision
makers, and official statistics still stress the low
efficiency of irrigation schemes, reported to range
from 28 to 42 percent in the Esfahan Province
(Keshavarz and Heydari 2003). The case of the
lower Colorado, where an alleged win-win
agreement between the Southern California
Metropolitan Water Authority (MWA) and the
Imperial Irrigation District (IID) took place in
1998, is a good example of excessive optimism.
This celebrated arrangement includes the lining
of the All-American canal by MWA and the right
of usufruct of an estimated 100 million m3
conserved through this intervention granted to
MWA (CGER 1992). In fact, it is apparent that
the so-called “savings” are detrimental to the
recharge and quality of the aquifer, which is
tapped by Mexican farmers on the other side of
the border, in the Mexicali Valley, thus resulting
in further decline of this resource (Cortez-Lara
and Garcia-Acevedo 1999). Win-win hydrologic
situations often have a forgotten “lose” side
somewhere else.
Future Waterscapes in the Village
Changes in the economy, demography and the
resource base of the village, most of which are
shaped by macro evolutions that transcend its
boundaries, are likely to govern the main
evolutions of the village.
The most critical problem is the current
economic crisis, which increases population
pressure over resources. Unemployment of youth
is very high in the village and this has brought
drug-addiction problems and raised crime to
levels hitherto unheard of. One nearby textile
factory is about to close, compounding the
situation. The population is still on the rise,
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despite a sheer drop in fertility but emigration
seems to be limited.
Nowadays, more than half of the farmers do
not live in the village but reside in their great
majority in the nearby city of Najafabad. This is
because many of their children have moved to
the city and settled there and they have followed
them rather than staying alone. On the other
hand, some strangers to the village, usually
Najafabadi willing to make investments, have
also bought gardens but they do not reside in the
village. Their number is less than 10 percent of
the total number of farmers. Absentee owners
either pay some employees to take care of their
farm or rely on relatives or neighbors to do so.
Because of the sharp difference between
income derived from gardens and from annual
crops, the loss of approximately half of the
gardens has severe implications on the village
economy. Whether water supply will soon return
to pre-drought levels or whether recovery will be
affected by more dry spells will determine if and
when orchards will be reestablished. Villagers
seem undoubtedly to be attached to their
gardens. This is true because of the investments
made but more for sentimental reasons, as
illustrated by a landowner who emigrated to the
United States but returned to see his garden
after the drought. Owning a garden is considered
socially prestigious (Kielstra 1989). However, it
can be feared that creeping and enduring water
scarcity will hamper recovery and discourage
many to invest in their gardens. The very slow
recovery of wells is an ominous sign that another
severe drought might be fatal. Selling water
rights may thus be an increasingly adopted
option, with concentration of rights in more
limited and secured gardens.
The options explored by the Jalalabad
villagers to ease pressure over water resources
include the following strategies:
a) Augmenting the discharge of the
Jahanabad qanat is the easiest and most
straightforward option under their control.
This strategy has been highly rewarded in
the past, with the discovery of a water
“vein” that doubled the discharge of the
qanat. Furthering the part of the gallery
situated within the aquifer increases
supply, and the subsequent gain in depth
is also an insurance against further drops
in the water table.
b) Another solution to water scarcity
explored by the Jalalabad villagers is the
purchase of the Jusdun qanat. The qanat
is currently dry but this is partly due to its
poor maintenance and the collapse of
some parts of the gallery. This has raised
the pressure in the upper reach of the
qanat and has created a reemergence in
the pit located in a riverbed crossed by
the qanat.41 Since Jusdun is now supplied
with water from the Nekouabad canal, its
villagers do not bother spending money to
maintain their qanat and Jalalabad has
declared its interest in buying it and in
making the necessary investments to
restore it.
c) A last option is to battle to obtain the
extension of the delivery canal coming
from the Khamiran dam down to the
village and a share of its supply. The
villagers have brought their case forward
to Esfahan, in the Ministry of Energy, and
have been orally promised 10 l/s from the
dam as compensation to their right to the
Mourhab water. Since nothing has been
achieved, they recently decided to hire a
lawyer to further their case. In addition,
41Since the top of the shaft located in the depression of the riverbed is much lower than the others, a “spring” has appeared in the (usually
dry) river. The eagerness of the search for water can be sensed by the fact that, during our visit to this place, a farmer from a nearby village
was observing the reemergence accompanied by an engineer who was expected to advise on the best way of tapping it.
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they intend contesting the case of the
village highlands, where investments have
been made but where the government’s
contribution has not been forthcoming.
d) On the demand side, agricultural
strategies include change in crop type,
crop insurance,42 improvement of irrigation
at the plot level, or adoption of micro-
irrigation. This solution is put forward by
governmental line agencies. The creed
that technology saves water, however, is
missing the point. Such a shift, just like
the lining of the canals during the
drought, would reduce infiltration losses
and also the amount of water in the
aquifer tapped by the very villagers
through their wells, as well as by
downstream users, through wells and
qanats. Micro-irrigation would only
increase and concentrate depletion of
water in the village while compounding
the situation elsewhere. This option,
however, is likely to spread in the future
since it is the logic of the individual that
prevails, and since third-party impacts are
not recognized or, sometimes, not
identified. In addition, it fits an image of
modernization that officials are eager to
embrace and propose. One may envision
a future where greenhouses and more
capital-intensive ventures will gradually
develop at the expense of traditional
farming. While such a shift would be
desirable in terms of economic efficiency,
it is unlikely to benefit all farmers across
the board, and its social value is
uncertain.
The Challenge of Water Rights
The absence of clear water rights means that
interventions, reappropriation and redistribution,
with their impacts across scales and social
groups, are a sizeable reality. The three main
losers of this lack of overall control over
resources use in the Zayandeh Rud are, not
surprisingly, those most commonly and primarily
affected in closing basins: the downstream users,
the next generations and the environment, the
latter two being the “stakeholders” who typically
have less bargaining power. Next generations are
affected by the mining of aquifers and the
gradual depletion of groundwater resources. The
environment bears the brunt of the reduction of
flows at a time where more water is generally
needed to dilute pollution. Downstream “users”
include the last irrigation sectors of the Rudasht
and the Gavkhuni swamp. Salinity of soil and
water in Rudasht has been shown to be on the
rise and prone to increase in the future (IWMI
and AREO 2004; Morid 2003). Environmental
degradation (electric conductivity of water
draining from Rudasht typically at 6-12 dS m-1)
(Salemi et al. 2000) can be contrasted with the
affluent past of the area. Ibn Hawqal (1889)
reported that, in the tenth century, the districts of
Ruwaidasht and Baraan constituted “an important
region in which ten mosques can be found.
Harvests are abundant and all the supply of
Esfahan comes from it.”
It is tempting to think that because of the
closure of the basin and growing competition for
water, the formalization of rights is both needed
and inevitable. Property rights are widely seen by
neoclassical economists as an endogenous
response to conflicts, where they restore
42For a yearly amount of 5,500 tumans/jerib of almond trees, the indemnity in case of crop loss (as occurred last year because of frost) is as
high as 70,000 tumans/jerib (more than what the yearly income would be).
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certainty and legibility and reduce transaction
costs. This could be substantiated by the
opening sentence of the sixteenth century firman
on the Zayandeh Rud water mentioned earlier:
“The royal command was given that, since
differences had arisen in the villages and the
water shares of the Zayandeh Rud of Esfahan…”
However, there are several difficulties to such
an establishment, and this applies not only to the
Zayandeh Rud basin but also to most situations.
The first reason, alluded to earlier, is the
complexity of hydrology and the lack of
quantitative representation and knowledge about
the different fluxes of water, notably those of
groundwater. The second is the variability and
unpredictability of these hydrologic processes,
which have drastic implications on how the
definition of rights would incorporate this
variability. The third reason is political, whereby
state actors may prefer, or at least content
themselves with, a more fuzzy allocation process
at their discretion rather than an open one with
painstaking consensus-building and negotiations.
Just like in the case of the Nekouabad canal
discussed earlier, it is always possible to
accommodate an additional use (e.g., the
demand of water by the city of Yazd, which lies
out of the basin) since the corresponding
discharge is limited with regard to the average
supply. The impact of such a use is thus likely to
be distributed over a large area. The supply from
the river will be slightly reduced (say, by 1 or
2%) but this impact will be imperceptibly spread
over all irrigation areas.
There are two caveats, however. First,
several such relatively minor reallocations
combined together will eventually have a more
sizeable impact. Irrigation areas are likely to
respond by withdrawing the shortfall from
aquifers, in an (already) unsustainable way.
Second, this disregards what happens in
situations of drastic shortage, when agricultural
use is severely curtailed and when commitments
to urban supply see their relative weight in
demand gaining predominance. In 2001, for
example, diversions to agriculture were totally
interrupted, despite water releases from the dam
still amounting to 39 percent of yearly average
values (Molle and Mamanpoush 2004). Because
nonagricultural uses have little flexibility, crises
become more frequent and more visible, since
they impact on cities.
It is tempting, once fuzziness in water
allocation has been identified, to prescribe a
clarification couched in terms of water rights, a
policy recommendation that has become
fashionable in the last few years. However,
establishing formal water rights cannot be
achieved by fiat and is predicated upon crucial
prerequisites (Molle 2004). More pragmatically,
water allocation is a process that needs to be
oriented towards greater transparency and
participation, informed by hard data and
improved hydrologic knowledge, and negotiated
by the groups of users concerned.
The conflict between state allocation and
traditional rights does not mean that the latter
should disappear, nor that they should be
immutable. The change in supply brought about
by the Chadegan dam and the successive
tunnels certainly allows for growth in demand and
use, and is quantitatively large enough to warrant
a redefinition of rights. What is missing, however,
is a mechanism to define new rights and make
societal choices in a transparent and negotiated
manner, with due consideration to environmental
services. It is thus essential to understand the
interconnectedness of uses and the third-party
impact of the decisions taken.
As mentioned above, the challenge of
establishing negotiated patterns of allocation or
water rights is one of multilevel governance.
National-level issues include political (and
conflicting) decisions about trans-basin diversions
and arrangements to share water between
provinces. For example, the Chaharmahal-va-
Bakhtiari Province, which has part of its border
with the Esfahan Province made up by the
Zayandeh Rud itself, is supporting extensive
development of an irrigated almond orchard
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based on the idea that the river is also “ours.”
Within the Esfahan Province, the Ministry of
Power has large discretionary power on the
allocation of Chadegan dam water, and
accommodates demands and requests from MPs
or other political constituencies (Ghazi 2003). The
city of Esfahan itself may take decisions about
surface water use that are not consistent with
basin management (“green ring,” etc.). At a more
local level, farmers tend to deplete as much
surface water and underground water as
available to them before it flows downstream.
Establishing a sound water regime at the basin
level is thus a monumental task that needs
governance patterns that are yet to emerge.
Conclusions
The study of Jalalabad has illustrated the quest
for water of a village and its multiple adaptations
to water scarcity and relative imbalances
between population, demand and supply. The
value and centrality of land and water were
illustrated by the strong social control upon
ownership and transactions, as well as by the
prices fetched and the marginal cost of providing
additional supply.
The struggle for water increases with the
closure of the basin. While the solutions to local
water scarcity tend to lie more and more
upstream and at a wider scale, the impacts of
local processes extend further and further
downstream. This critical interconnectedness of
actors through the hydrologic cycle is complex,
sometimes unpredictable, often invisible,
frequently ignored, and always obscured by the
variability and fluctuation of hydrological
processes. Upstream/downstream and surface
water/groundwater interactions get more intricate
as users diversify their sources of water.
Unchecked individual initiatives may add up and
have a significant impact at the macro level.
Macro-level interventions, in return, critically alter
the hydrological regime and preexisting water-
sharing arrangements. In such a process, local
and global interventions tend to conflict, and
control over water to shift toward the state.
A consequence of the closure of the basin
that, despite being obvious, cannot be
overemphasized is the logical impossibility of
overall water conservation. Local conservation
measures are possible but they necessarily have
third-party impacts, be it on other users, next
generations or on the environment. Therefore,
while such local measures may have benefit for
the users involved, they are eventually
tantamount to reallocation of water within the
basin. Shifting the benefit of water may be
desirable or not, but it is rarely explicit and raises
questions on water rights and on the third-party
impacts.
The study has sketched out an exploration of
the human-water interface whereby institutions
around water allocation and management are
mediated by political, cultural and ecological
contexts that interact across multiple, spatial and
social scales (Sneddon et al. 2002). The
complexity of these macro-micro interactions,
however, makes the state incapable of reordering
the basin water regime by its sole action or by
legislation. Constructing a sound and sustainable
water regime is contingent upon allowing
multilevel governance patterns that allow interest
groups to negotiate arrangements, which bring
more certainty, social value and equity to the
sharing of water. In the Zayandeh Rud basin, the
challenge could be to reestablish the earlier
democratic, transparent and stakeholder-
controlled allocation (when mirabs were elected),
albeit in a much more complex physical and
social setting than in the past, demanding both
an increasing knowledge of the basin hydrology
and expanded arenas of representation and
negotiations.
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